Autonomous Learning Conference Paper 2023

On Imitation in Mean-field Games

We explore the problem of imitation learning (IL) in the context of mean-field games (MFGs), where the goal is to imitate the behavior of a population of agents following a Nash equilibrium policy according to some unknown payoff function. IL in MFGs presents new challenges compared to single-agent IL, particularly when both the reward function and the transition kernel depend on the population distribution. In this paper, departing from the existing literature on IL for MFGs, we introduce a new solution concept called the Nash imitation gap. Then we show that when only the reward depends on the population distribution, IL in MFGs can be reduced to single-agent IL with similar guarantees. However, when the dynamics is population-dependent, we provide a novel upper-bound that suggests IL is harder in this setting. To address this issue, we propose a new adversarial formulation where the reinforcement learning problem is replaced by a mean-field control (MFC) problem, suggesting progress in IL within MFGs may have to build upon MFC.

Author(s): Ramponi, Giorgia and Kolev, Pavel and Pietquin Olivier and He, Niao and Laurière, Mathieu and Geist, Matthieu
Book Title: Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 36 (NeurIPS 2023)
Pages: 1-12
Year: 2023
Month: December
Day: 10-16
Bibtex Type: Conference Paper (inproceedings)
Address: Curran Associates Inc.
DOI: https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper_files/paper/2023/file/7f2223201858b6ff4cc1832d8856459b-Paper-Conference.pdf
Event Name: NeurIPS 2023
Event Place: New Orleans, Louisiana, USAea
State: Published
URL: https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper_files/paper/2023/file/7f2223201858b6ff4cc1832d8856459b-Paper-Conference.pdf
Digital: True

BibTex

@inproceedings{RamponiKolevEtal2023:imitationmeanfieldgames,
  title = {On Imitation in Mean-field Games},
  booktitle = {Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 36 (NeurIPS 2023)},
  abstract = {We explore the problem of imitation learning (IL) in the context of mean-field games (MFGs), where the goal is to imitate the behavior of a population of agents following a Nash equilibrium policy according to some unknown payoff function. IL in MFGs presents new challenges compared to single-agent IL, particularly when both the reward function and the transition kernel depend on the population distribution. In this paper, departing from the existing literature on IL for MFGs, we introduce a new solution concept called the Nash imitation gap. Then we show that when only the reward depends on the population distribution, IL in MFGs can be reduced to single-agent IL with similar guarantees. However, when the dynamics is population-dependent, we provide a novel upper-bound that suggests IL is harder in this setting. To address this issue, we propose a new adversarial formulation where the reinforcement learning problem is replaced by a mean-field control (MFC) problem, suggesting progress in IL within MFGs may have to build upon MFC. },
  pages = {1-12},
  address = {Curran Associates Inc.},
  month = dec,
  year = {2023},
  slug = {ramponikolevetal2023-imitationmeanfieldgames},
  author = {Ramponi, Giorgia and Kolev, Pavel and Olivier, Pietquin and He, Niao and Lauri{\`{e}}re, Mathieu and Geist, Matthieu},
  url = {https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper_files/paper/2023/file/7f2223201858b6ff4cc1832d8856459b-Paper-Conference.pdf},
  month_numeric = {12}
}